Good and hungry--The changes facing fast food *More than menus need to be revamped if fast-food fir——青夏教育精英家教网—

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2.Good and hungry--The changes facing fast food

*More than menus need to be revamped if fast-food firms want to keep growing

FAST-FOOD firms have to be a thick-skinned bunch. Health experts regularly lambast them for peddling food that makes people fat. Critics even complain that McDonald’s, whose golden arches symbolise calorie excess, should not have been allowed to sponsor the World Cup. These are things fast-food firms have learnt to cope with and to deflect. But not perhaps for much longer. The burger business faces more pressure from regulators at a time when it is already adapting strategies in response to shifts in the global economy.

Fast food was once thought to be recession-proof. When consumers need to cut spending, the logic goes, cheap meals like Big Macs and Whoppers become even more attractive. Such “trading down” proved true for much of the latest recession, when fast-food companies picked up customers who could no longer afford to eat at casual restaurants. Traffic was boosted in America, the home of fast food, with discounts and promotions, such as $1 menus and cheap combination meals.

As a result, fast-food chains have weathered the recession better than their pricier competitors. In 2009 sales at full-service restaurants in America fell by more than 6%, but total sales remained about the same at fast-food chains. In some markets, such as Japan, France and Britain, total spending on fast food increased. Same-store sales in America at McDonald’s, the world’s largest fast-food company, did not decline throughout the downturn. Panera Bread, an American fast-food chain known for its fresh ingredients, performed well, too: its boss, Ron Shaich, claims this is because it offers higher-quality food at lower prices than restaurants.

But not all fast-food companies have been as fortunate. Many, such as Burger King, have seen sales fall. In a severe recession, while some people trade down to fast food, many others eat at home more frequently to save money. David Palmer, an analyst at UBS, a bank, says smaller fast-food chains in America, such as Jack in the Box and Carl’s Jr., have been hit particularly hard in this downturn because at the same time they are “slugging it out with a global powerhouse” in the form of McDonald’s, which ramped up spending on advertising by more than 7% last year as others cut back.

Some fast-food companies also cannibalised their own profits by trying to give customers better value. During the recession companies set prices low, hoping that once they had tempted customers through the door they would be persuaded to order more expensive items. But in many cases that strategy backfired. Last year Burger King franchisees sued the company over its double-cheeseburger promotion, claiming it was unfair for them to be required to sell these for $1 when they cost $1.10 to make. In May a judge ruled in favour of Burger King. Nevertheless, the company may still be cursing its decision to promote cheap choices over more expensive ones because items on its “value menu” now account for around 20% of all sales, up from 12% last October.

Analysts expect the fast-food industry to grow modestly this year. But the downturn is making them rethink their strategies. Many companies are now introducing higher-priced items to entice consumers away from $1 specials. KFC, a division of Yum! Brands, which also owns Taco Bell and Pizza Hut, has launched a chicken sandwich that costs around $5. And in May Burger King introduced barbecue pork ribs at a hefty $7 for eight.

More cheeseburgers

Companies are also trying to get customers to buy new and more items, including drinks. McDonald’s started selling better coffee as a challenge to Starbucks. Its “McCafé” line now accounts for an estimated 6% of sales in America. Others are testing a similar strategy. Starbucks has sold rights to its Seattle’s Best coffee brand to Burger King, which will start selling it later this year. McDonald’s is now rolling out frappé coffees and smoothies.

As fast-food companies shift from “super size” to “more buys” they need to keep customer traffic high throughout the day. Many see breakfast as a big opportunity, and not just for fatty food. McDonald’s will start selling porridge in America next year. Breakfast has the potential to be very lucrative, says Sara Senatore of Bernstein, a research firm, because the margins can be high. Fast-food companies are also adding midday and late-night snacks, such as blended drinks and wraps. The idea is that by having a greater range of things on the menu, “we can sell to consumers products they want all day,” says Rick Carucci, the chief financial officer of Yum! Brands.

Yet growth opportunities in America are limited because the market is considered to be “saturated”, not so much in fats but outlets. China is the place where most fast-food chains, like so many industries, see big expansion. Mr Carucci, for one, thinks China will be “the biggest growth opportunity for the industry this century”. If so, then Yum!, which has the greatest presence in China of any Western fast-food company, will be celebrating. Already around 30% of the company’s profits come from China, and in the next five years this is expected to grow to 40%. India also looks like a succulent opportunity. Others plan to serve up more business in Russia and elsewhere in Europe. Given that around 75% of fast-food companies’ revenue in Europe comes from people eating in the restaurants (compared with half in America), older European outlets are being done up to make them more attractive places.

Getting chunky

The recession also proved the importance of size in competing for customers, which means that more consolidation is likely. Wendy’s and Arby’s, two American fast-food chains, merged in 2008. On June 11th their shares surged following news that a buyer was interested in the company. Smaller chains may catch the eye of private-equity firms, just as CKE Restaurants did earlier this year when Apollo Management, a buy-out firm, purchased it.

But what about those growing waistlines? So far, fast-food firms have nimbly avoided government regulation. By providing healthy options, like salads and low-calorie sandwiches, they have at least given the impression of doing something about helping to fight obesity. These offerings are not necessarily loss-leaders, as they broaden the appeal of outlets to groups of diners that include some people who don’t want to eat a burger. But customers cannot be forced to order salads instead of fries.

In the future, simply offering a healthy option may not be good enough. “Every packaged-food and restaurant company I know is concerned about regulation right now,” says Mr Palmer of UBS. America’s health-reform bill, which Congress passed this year, requires restaurant chains with 20 or more outlets to put the calorie-content of items they serve on the menu. A study by the National Bureau of Economic Research, which tracked the effects on Starbucks of a similar calorie-posting law in New York City in 2007, found that the average calorie-count per transaction fell 6% and revenue increased 3% at Starbucks stores where a Dunkin Donuts outlet was nearby-a sign, it is said, that menu-labelling could favour chains that have more nutritious offerings.

In order to avoid other legislation in America and elsewhere, fast-food companies will have to continue innovating. Walt Riker of McDonald’s claims the makeover it has given to its menu means it offers more healthy items than it did a few years ago. “We probably sell more lettuce, more milk, more salads, more apples than any restaurant business in the world,” he says. But the recent proposal by a county in California to ban the golden arches from including toys in its high-calorie “Happy Meals”, because legislators believe it attracts children to unhealthy food, suggests there is a lot more left to do.

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1.Europe's 750 billion euro bazooka

AT two in the morning on May 10th, European Union finance ministers agreed a huge increase in their political will to defend Europe's single currency, backed by a stunning ?750 billion in aid for weak links in the 16 member eurozone. Simultaneously, the European Central Bank took a revolutionary shift away from its inflation-fighting mission, announcing a scheme to buy up government bonds on the financial markets.

That new sense of resolve is good news. The more troubling news is that it took 11 hours of bitter wrangling to get the ministers to that point, and-thanks to continued German anxiety about undermining eurozone discipline by bailing out the profligate-there will be three separate mechanisms to deliver that ?750 billion, of such fiendish complexity that EU officials are still not quite sure how it will all work. In a nice irony, the ministers-who have spent weeks denouncing financial markets as wicked speculators-only stopped arguing and agreed a plan in the early hours of this morning because they knew markets were about to open in Asia, well-informed sources say.

Does the good news trump the troubling news? Yes: as long as lingering disagreements and uncertainties do not hold up the rescue plan. Europe is building its own financial bazooka to warn off the markets, to borrow Hank Paulson's image. If it is ready to fire when needed, then complexity probably does not matter for now.

What has been agreed?

First off, a ?60 billion rapid reaction stabilisation fund, controlled by the European Commission, and able to send ready money to eurozone countries that are in a financing crunch. The mechanism is modelled on an existing scheme for non-euro economies, the "balance of payments facility". The money is borrowed by the commission on the markets, using the EU budget as collateral. Because the EU budget cannot legally go into the red, that means that all 27 EU members are on the hook if money from this ?60 billion pot is disbursed and not paid back: to simplify, all members would have to pay extra into the budget to top it up. Britain, for instance, would be on the hook for 12% of any losses: Alistair Darling, still the British chancellor of the exchequer, approved this after consulting his Tory counterpart, George Osborne, by telephone.

Secondly, a "special purpose vehicle" (don't call it a fund or Eurobonds, or the Germans will be very cross), which will be created in the next few days by an intergovernmental agreement among eurozone members, and which will raise up to ?440 billion euro on the markets using a blend of loans and loan guarantees from the 16 members of the single currency club. The European Commission wanted formal control of this warchest, using a clause of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 122 that allows the commission to rush emergency aid to countries hit by natural disasters or exceptional crises beyond their control (Article 122 will be used for the ?60 billion pot).

The Germans, Dutch, Finns, Austrians and others, backed by the British, said no, and in the end won this argument: the commission may be invited to manage the warchest, which is also described as a temporary three year creation. The Germans were also insistent that the fund should work in the same way as the ?110 billion rescue package just agreed for Greece: meaning it should involve money and budget discipline measures from the International Monetary Fund, and meaning that it should be a package of bilateral loans from each of the 16, rather than open-ended loan guarantees. The French, in particular, dreamed of open-ended loan guarantees and an EU-only structure: ie, something very close to a permanent Eurobond bailout instrument. Germany said no, but that may or may not look in the future like a victory on process, not on the substance.

Thirdly, the finance ministers demanded that Spain and Portugal should work harder on consolidating their budgets this year and next: that was politically very hard for the Spanish (who were nominally chairing the meeting). The Spanish have asked to come back with a plan next week.

Fourthly, there was a stunning announcement that the IMF would match every two euros of EU rescue money with one of its own. That could take the IMF contribution up to ?220 or ?250 billion, depending on whether they are matching the ?60 billion too. In a slightly surreal moment, the Spanish economy minister Elena Salgado could not decide whether that extra ?30 billion was part of the deal. Some of us are old enough (ie, we were alive three weeks ago) to remember when the EU as a whole thought ?30 billion was enough money on its own to put on the table and order markets to back off.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the European Central Bank went off and agreed exactly the thing that banks and politicians had been urging it to do: ie, start buying up government bonds on the financial markets. Where does that leave ECB independence? In a tricky place, not to mention the ECB's central mission to fight inflation, which is in danger of being trumped by political demands from the national governments of the eurozone.

One of the gripping stories of this crisis has been the roller-coaster fortunes of the ECB boss, Jean-Claude Trichet. About nine months ago, Mr Trichet was one of the undisputed winners of the meltdown, hailed for his calm and decisive management of the banking crisis. The last few months have been brutal for this urbane Frenchman. First he said it would be a "humiliation" for the IMF to be involved in rescuing Greece, only to have to eat his words. Then he said it was as clear as a mountain stream that the ECB could not make an exception for Greece alone, when it came to accepting Greek debt as collateral even if it was downgraded to junk by credit rating agencies. Then he had to eat his words on that too.

So, what does this all mean politically? Is it the birth of Eurobonds, and a fiscal transfer union, in which the rich and strong pay for the weak? A sneaky way out of that question is to say that we have effectively had Eurobonds for ages, in the form of the balance of payments mechanism (which was used only recently for Hungary and Latvia) and that we have had transfers from rich to poor in the form of structural and cohesion funds (ie, aid for poorer regions).

But that would be a cowardly answer. I have been saying for ages that I did not believe that the political will was there to move to the sort of political or economic union that some in Brussels have always said was needed to make the euro work. Do I still think I am right?

I think that the politics have shifted dramatically in the last few days, and that the euro is looking less German and more French, even if Angela Merkel has won some late victories on process by insisting that national governments should not give open-ended loan guarantees to the European Commission to play with. I think that the EU has developed a much stronger external narrative, telling markets that they should treat the eurozone as a single whole, which is strong and solvent, and not try to pick off weaker members because they will get their fingers burned.

But, and I think this is still a big but, the political narrative inside the eurozone is still lagging way behind. If the markets outside are being told to treat the eurozone as a single fortress, defended by unlimited budgetary firepower from the rich members of the club, voters in places like Germany, the Netherlands or Finland are absolutely not being told that they now inhabit a single economic entity, in which big chunks of the budget are pooled.

Instead, the political messages being delivered internally are heading in quite different directions.

One, the Germans and co are still insisting that the point of constructing a vast bazooka is to avoid ever having to fire it. In other words, whether or not you think the leaders are stumbling backwards into a fiscal transfer union, that is certainly not their purported intention: the intention is for none of this money ever to be needed.

Two, the political ground is not being prepared for a fiscal union: Angela Merkel has not gone on German television to tell German voters that the euro is incredibly important to their way of life and their prosperity, and that defending it may cost painful amounts of money.

Instead, the anti-market rhetoric is being stepped up to fever pitch. Markets are wicked speculators, or "wolf packs" if you listen to the Swedish finance minister. there is an international conspiracy to destroy the euro, says Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of Luxembourg.

In concrete terms, leaders like Mrs Merkel have yet to make the positive case for saving the euro, instead preferring to make the negative case for punishing speculators (though, I note, those evil speculators magically turn back into "international markets" when the EU wants to raise ?440 billion in a short space of time).

A political quid pro quo is being prepared to buy off voters furious at the idea of sending money to weak or profligate members of the club, involving much tougher regulation of those wicked markets. Mrs Salgado last night talked of probing the role played by credit ratings agencies, and much tougher regulation of derivatives. There is constant talk of financial transaction taxes. Nobody is denying that regulation will not need to change in the future, but the suggestions so far have much more to do with populism than common sense.

The idea of a publicly funded European Credit Rating Agency, supported by France and Germany, is particularly asinine: if the ECRA is much more bullish about EU sovereign debt than the commercial ratings agencies, markets will assume it is no more than a man next to a fax machine, taking orders from Paris and Berlin. In which case it is not obvious what good it will do. On the other hand, if its ratings match those of the commercial ratings agencies, it will change nothing in the markets, and it is not obvious what good it will do.

I think this bellicose talk of fighting battles with markets and being at war with perfidious bankers (to quote Mrs Merkel) may point to a useful analogy for what is going on in terms of political integration here, at least at this point. I wonder if this new intergovernmental warchest of ?440 billion, working with the intergovernmental IMF, is a bit like the mutual defence clause, Article 5, in the NATO treaty, that says an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all. That is hugely important, and commits each member government to big and serious things. But it is not the same as those member countries agreeing to pool their militaries.

A wise colleague makes the point that the oddity for years was that markets gave all eurozone countries almost the same rates, ie assumed (wrongly) that default risk had gone. In many ways the past few months have been healthy as that assumption no longer holds. But the corollary is indeed the discovery that heavy borrowers can lose some of their independence. But, he points out, big borrowers often lose some sovereignty, because markets set limits on debts. Greece has lost fiscal independence not because it is moving towards being a part of a federal state but because it cannot any longer raise money in the markets.

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26、(本题满分14分)

如图，已知抛物线y=x²+bx-3a过点A(1,0)，B(0,-3),与x轴交于另一点C。

(1)求抛物线的解析式；

(2)若在第三象限的抛物线上存在点P，使△PBC为以点B为直角顶点的直角三角形，求点P的坐标；

(3)在(2)的条件下，在抛物线上是否存在一点Q，使以P,Q,B,C为顶点的四边形为直角梯形？若存在，请求出点Q的坐标；若不存在，请说明理由。